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STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintif {-Respondent, 
vs. 
ERSELL HARRIS, JR., 
Def eandant-A ppellant. 
Case No. 
12424 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEl\IENT OF 
THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
The appellant, Ersell Harris, Jr. appeals from a 
i11r>' \"erdict entered against him in the Third Judicial 
District Court, convicting him of forgery. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant was convicted of forgery before the 
Honorable l\Ierrill C. Faux, in Third Judicial District 
Co11rl, on September 29, 1970. He was sentenced to 
~PITe the indeterminate sentence as provided by law. 
2 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
. The res~)ondent respectfully submits that the deri 
s1ons and rulmgs of the Court below should be sustained. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On September 17, 1969, appellant stood trial j
11 
Criminal Case No. 20544 in the Third District Court 
before the Honorable D. Frank 'i\Tilkins. He 11,3, 
charged with uttering a fictitious check in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-26-7 (1953) (R. 3, 48). Tlie 
jury was impaneled ( R. 4), exhibits were introduced 
( R. 10) , and witnesses were sworn and testified. After · 
the defense rested, a motion to dismiss the case was madt 
by the defense. The court granted the motion on tne 
grounds that according to to the Utah Supreme Court 
decision in State v. Fox, 22 Utah 2d 211, 450 P.2d 98; : 
( 1969), appellant had been ~barged under the \\Toni 
statute. He should have geen charged with forgery under 
Utah Code Ann.§ 76-26-1 (R. 75-77). 
Appellant testified for the record his approral ol : 
the action when being questioned by his attorney, )!i 
Jay Barney. 
"Mr. Barney: And I have consulted wi~h 
you regarding this particular motion for a dis· 
missal of this case, have I not? 
Mr. Harris: Yes, sir. 
Mr. Barney: You understand t~at the 
state may still file a new charge on this case, 
3 
and it may be that of forgery, which would 
carry a penalty of one to twenty years? 
l\Ir. Harris: Yes. 
l\Ir. Barney: Nevertheless it is your de-
sire, and was and is your desire that we proceed 
on your motion to dismiss, and, have your case 
dismissed at this time, is that correct? 
l\Ir. Harris: Yes. 
The Court: l\Iotion granted." (R. of 
Criminal No. 20544, 75-76). 
Subsequently, on September 28, 1970, appellant 
was brought before Judge Merrill Faux in Criminal 
Case No. 22177 in the Third District Court charged 
with forging a check in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§ 77-26-1 ( 1953) ( R. 5) . The defense made a motion 
to the court to dismiss on the grounds of former 
jeopardy, which motion was denied (R. 15, 51). A jury 




THE DEFENSE OF DOUBLE JEOP AR-
DY \VAS NOT AVAILABLE TO APPELLANT 
AS HE KNOWINGLY CONSENTED TO THE 
DISMISSAL OF THE JURY IN THE FIRST 
TRIAL ON HIS COUNSEL'S MOTION. 
Respondent agrees with appellant that the double 
4 
jeopardy standard imposed by the Fifth Am dn . en ;ent 
of the Umted States Constitution is applicable t t • . • o s at1 
c1:1mmal prosecutions. For the moment, respondent will 
discuss the matter at hand as though the two crimes of 
which appellant was accused in the two different trial.i 
were sufficiently alike so as to be considered one (a con-
tention disputed in Point II). That would put the case 
in the general category of a mistrial declared by tne 
trial judge on defendant's motion and with his know-
ing consent as the record of the first trial indicates (R. 
75-77). A vast majority of jurisdictions including Utan 
hold that in those circumstances the constitutional plea 
of former jeopardy is no defense. See, for example. 
People v. Kelly, 132 Cal.App. 118, 22 P.2d 526 (1933): 
State v. Arnold, 142 Kan. 589, 50 P.2d 1008 (193jJ: 
Commonwealth v. Compopiano, 254 Mass 560, 150X.E. 
844 ( 1926) ; Leigh v. United States, 329 F.2d 883 
(D.C. Cir. 1964); United States v. Gori, 282 F.2dl:l , 
(2nd Cir. 1960), upheld 367 U.S. 364, 6 L.Ed.2d 901. 
81 S.Ct. 1523 ( 1961). People v. Kern, 8 Utah 268, 30 
P.988 (1892). 
Even had appellant objected to the dismissal ot' , 
the jury, the circumstances are similar enough to the 
case of Illinois v. Somerville, ______ U.S ...... ., 35 L.Ed.j/ 
425, 93 S.Ct. 1066 (1973), for it to be controlling. 
There, the defendant was brought to trial under a d~ 
. . . h Id 't b mended under JI. f ecbve md1ctment t at cou n e a 
linois law. That defect could have been asserted on W
1 · f The tr1a 
peal to overturn a judgment of conv1c 10n. 
-
5 
judge declared a mistrial and dismissed the case over 
the defendant's objection. Subsequently, the defendant 
was reiudicted, tried, and convicted. 
The United States Supreme Court held that the 
derlaration of a mistrial was required by the "manifest 
necessit:·/' and the "ends of public justice" test of 
l'11itcrl States t'. Perez, 9 'i\Theat. 22 U.S. 579, 6 L.Ed. 
:?d 16.5 ( 1824). Therefore, double jeopardy was no de-
fense. 
Tlw following reasoning of the court is especially 
pertinent to the case at hand: 
"A trial judge properly exercises his dis-
cretion to declare a mistrial if an impartial 
verdict cannot be reached, or if a verdict of con-
Yiction be reached but would have to be reversed 
on appeal due to an obvious procedural error in 
the trial. If an error would make a reversal 
on appeal a certainty, it would not serve 'the 
ends of public justice' to require that the Gov-
ernment proceed with its proof when, if it suc-
ceeded before the jury, it would automatically 
be stripped of that success by an appellate 
court." 35 L.Ed.2d at 431. 
And further, 
If a mistrial were constitutionally unavail-
able in situations such as this, the State's policy 
could only be implemented by conducting a 
second trial after verdict and reversal on ap-
peal, thus wasting time, energy, and money for 
6 
all concerned." 35 L.Ed.2d at 432 433 s 
l S . , . ee a so, . zmpson v. United States, 229 F. 940 9th Cir. 1916). 
That the Somerville, supra, situation existed in the 
c~se at bar, .is clear from trial Judge vVilkins' exp Jana. 
hon to the Jury of why he was dismissing the case. 
"I am dismissing it [the case] because in 
my opinion, according to a [Utah] Supreme 
Court case that just came out ... the man has 
been charged under the wrong criminal statute 
... the charge should be that of forgery; not 
fictitious check." 
Under those circumstances, a guilty verdict most 
certainly would have been overturned on apeal followed 
by a new trial. That would be possible as such an appeal 
from a guilty verdict acts as a waiver of the defense of 
former jeopardy. See, United States v. Tateo, 377 U.S. 
463 (1964). 
Judge Wilkins used his discretion wisely in dismis 
sing the suit on appellant's motion and the court in su~ 
sequent forgery trial should not be overruled in its de-
cision not to allow the defense of former jeopardy. 
POINT II 
NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY EXISTED AS 
A DEFENSE FOR THE TWO OFFENSES OF 
'VHICH HE YV AS CHARGED AS THE T":o 
TRIALS 'VERE DISTINCTLY DIFF'ERE~T 
OFFEXSES. 
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It is ffell-estahlishecl that the plea of former jeop-
ardy applies onlr to a second prosecution for the same 
ad and crime both in law and fact. As the Supreme 
Court stated it: 
"Under the doctrine of former jeopardy 
. if the two actions were for the same of-
fense, the former was a complete bar to the 
latter, but if they were not the same offense, 
the former was no bar to any element of the 
latter, eYen though such element was common 
to both actions." State v. Thatcher, 108 Utah 
63, 157 p .2d 2.58 ( 194.5) . 
As the facts of this case show, in the first trial 
appellant was charged with uttering a fictitious check 
under Utah Code Ann. § 76-26-7 ( 1953). In the second 
trial he was charged with forging a check under Utah 
Code Ann. § 7 6-26-1 ( 1953) . 
"That the offense of uttering a fictitious 
instrument . . . is a separate and distinct of-
fense from that of uttering a forged instru-
ment . . . has been definitely settled by this 
court as well as many others." State v. Jensen, 
103 Utah 478, 483, 136 P.2d 949 (1943). 
In a more recent case of State v. Fox, 22 Utah 2d 
211, 450 P.2d 987 (1969), the Utah Supreme Court 
distinguished once more the two separate offenses by 
showing that different elements make up each offense. 
Explieitly, where the check is one with a heading of 
an existing company, then there is a forgery. That cov-
8 
ers the case at han<l. \Vhereas an uttering of r· ' a !Cit· 
tious check implies a nonexistent company. State v. FoJ 
supra. 
Therefore, it is plain that appellant's contentionor 
double jeopardy is groundless. He was charged ,11th 
two distinctly different offenses that had differente]e. 
ments. The trial court committed no error in not allow. 
ing the defense of former jeopardy to be a bar to ap-
pellant's prosecution at the second trial. 
POI~T III 
THE APPELLANT RECEIVED ADE 
(~UATE AND COl\IPETENT DEFENSE 
COUNSEL DURING HIS TRIAL FOR FORG-
ERY. 
The right to effective or adequate assistance nf 
counsel was first enunciated by the United States Su· 
preme Court in Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 65. i2 
L. Ed. 158, 53 S. Ct. 55 ( 1932), which held that failure 
to make an effective appointment of counsel violates 
the Sixth Amendment right to counsel and is a denial 
of due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
d h. · · S t H' s 6 l1 ~d Utah adopte t is view m ta e v. zne, · ·, 
126, 307 P .2d 887 ( 1957) , holding that the privilege 01 
an accused to the assistance of counsel is one of the fun· , 
9 
damental rights, meaning the assistance of a reputable 
member of the bar who is willing and in a position to 
honestly and conscientiously represent the interests of 
tbr defendant. In Alires v. Turner, 22 U.2d 118, 449 P. 
"Ld :!.J.1 ( 1969), the Court held that a failure to be pro-
rnlcrl effective assistace of counsel results in a denial 
of due process. See Article I, Sections 7 and 12 of the 
T 'tah Constitution. 
The United States Supreme Court has left to the 
state and lower courts the task of setting standards of 
trial attorney eff'ectiveness. If the standard be too strict, 
the defendant could he denied due process, but if too 
liberal, there is the threat of a stampede of prisoners 
daiming that their attorneys were not effective merely 
because they were not acquitted. 
California's standard of legal competency requires 
the petitioner to show that the trial was reduced to a 
farC'e or shun through the attorney's lack of competence, 
diligence or knowledge of the law. See In re Beaty, 64 
Cal. :!cl 7GO, 414 P. 2d 817, 51 Cal. Rptr. 521 (1966). 
In Arizona, the Court allows a contention of depri-
rntion of right to counsel to be asserted sufficient in 
only extreme cases. There must be facts to indicate that 
the attorney's performance was so substandard as to 
render the trial a farce or sham. See Barron v. State, 7 
Ariz. App. 223, 437 P. 2d 975 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1968). 
10 
Kansas has also adopted an extremely strict stand-
ard. In JI cGee 'l'. Crouse, 190 Kan. 615, 376 P. 2d i
9
" 
( 1962) , the Court said: · 
" ... the burden is cast upon the petitioner 
to show that his counsel was so incompetent 
and inadequate in representing him that the 
total effect was that of a complete absence of 
counsel." Id. at 618, 795. 
In 1'Vashington 'l'. 1'urner, 17 U.2d 361, 412 P. 2n 
449 ( 1966), the Court looked to the record for sugges· 
tions of "bad faith conduct" on the part of the attorney. 
This concept of "bad faith" was defined in Alires v. 
1'urner, supra, as follows: 
"The [due process] requirement [of coun· 
sel] is not satisfied by a sham or pretense of 
an appearance in the record by an attorney 
who manifests no real concern about the in· 
terests of the accused." (Emphasis added.) Id. 
at 121, 243. 
This Court also warned in Jaramillo v. Turner, 2! 
U. 2d 19, 465 P. 2d 343 (1970): 
". . . in order to prevent further erosion 
of the meaning of the Constitution of the 
United States and to revive the memory of 
what was originally intended by the Sixth 
Amendment thereto, we wish to address a few 
remarks to the new claim of inadequate repre-
senta tion by his layer. 
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"To begin with, this is usually but a loop-
hole through which guilty men hope to escape 
from the debts which they owe to society for 
past criminal beavior. It is a loophole through 
which other guilty men have escaped from their 
just desserts under the law, and it is a loop-
hole through which guilty men will be released 
to prey upon law-abiding citizens unless courts 
look more carefully at the requirements of 
the Constitution as set forth therein." Id. at 21, 
344. 
By these standards, the record reveals that the trial 
was not a farce or a sham. This is especially true when 
the only claim of incompetency is the failure to raise 
the defense of double jeopardy. It has clearly been 
shown that at very best such a defense had an extreme-
ly questionable legal foundation. Point I and II dem-
onstrate that, in fact, no former jeopardy defense was 
ever available to appellant. Therefore, the conviction 
cannot be justifiably overturned on the basis of incom-
petent counsel. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant received a fair trial represented adequate-
ly by counsel. Never did he have the defense of double 
jeopardy available to him due to his own acts of consent 
to the dismissal of the first case and due to the fact that 
the two sections of the Utah Code delineate two dis-
12 
inctly dif'f erent crimes. For these reasons, respondent 
respectfully submits that the conviction of Ersell 
Harris, Jr., should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted 
VERNON B. ROMNEY 
Attorney General 
DAVID L. WILKINSON 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
M. REID RUSSELL 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
